FP is not as sexy as they think it is

it is irritating that "opinionators" seem to only want to opine about foreign policy...somehow it's sexy, or something. domestic policy or critical analysis about american culture is blase. when i read about beinart's title i was hoping for an examination of how america as a society found itself in a situation, as a whole, where "success breeds disaster," which is how he summarizes his argument. instead it is some analytical claptrap about how foreign policy thinkers rationalize their respective courses of action.

reasons for the initial fascination

i did end up attending a couple of iran-related events in the aftermath of the unrest, but with the clampdown within iran (on dissidents, protests, media, etc.) the news emerging is limited and certainly less compelling for most, and the limited attention span here in the US, coverage and attention has waned somewhat. however, the stronger media outlets (NYT, NPR) that i read have done a good job of continuing their coverage.

a though during the earlier course of the election aftermath had occurred to me, and to rid myself of the scrap of paper upon which it is written, i figured i'd put it up here: the fascination with events in Iran goes beyond our simple interest in the human drama and stories that surround popular movements and uprisings. it connects us with visceral feelings of solidarity, protest, and empathy, of which there is often a paucity in the US, because while our system is orderly, it also engenders apathy.

i hope the situation in Iran continues to develop rather than stagnate or revert to a version of the status quo. i am not a westerner hoping for regime change or the overthrow of the islamic republic, but rather one who is hopeful for the emergence of a government there that respects the rules of democracy, the right of the people to peaceably assemble and to freely express their opinions and grievances, and ceases to harshly dictate standards of behavior, especially for women. seeing that list i can't say that i would expect major movement on these metrics, regardless of the outcome of the current unrest, but movement in the appropriate direction is movement nonetheless.

iran momentum

i had not mobilized myself to the street in support of the opposition in iran, as generally that is not my M.O., but had decided to do so...unfortunately the rally i was to attend tomorrow was canceled. i think this points to the gradual waning of the collective attention to this issue. not only have the authorities effectively limited dissent in iran, but other events continue in the US and elsewhere, and sadly peoples attention spans are short. it would have been good to participate in something last week, but i have at least kept myself informed on events, and at the very least have learned a great deal about iran that i may have not otherwise.

the nytimes discusses, as i'm sure others have, what are the next steps for the opposition movement. with protests suppressed, i think a general strike and some political machinations need to occur. but time will tell how things change. i pray that the voices of those opposed to repression are heard.

i've been too busy reading to say anything worthwhile (i did post a few things on facebook), but a couple thoughts:

from huffpo live-blogging (monday 6/22):

5:20 PM ET -- A word about the past two days. In ordinary times, the violence in the streets on Sunday and Monday would have been shocking. But compared to Saturday's massive outpouring, the turnout of demonstrators has been significantly smaller. There is a good reason for it.

Over the past week, the reformist rallies that have succeeded were those scheduled days in advance, with turnout aided by massive word-of-mouth promotion. Today's mourning rally for Neda, on the other hand, was announced only this morning on Karroubi's social networking sites. In the midst of a near-complete media and technological blackout, these large demonstrations need time to develop.

It's virtually impossible for anyone to gauge whether there is a petering off of intensity among demonstrators, who now know they face incredible risks if they show up in the streets. But the last two days should not be used to argue that the unrest has dampened. The reformists are organizing another major demonstration for Thursday, and a national strike is set to begin by tomorrow or Wednesday. Those will be far better guides to how Iranians are reacting to the government's campaign of repression.

and from the daily beast, via the lede, live blogging on monday as well:

On the Web site The Daily Beast, an Iranian university student explains that, in his family, the video has exposed the deep rift in the way younger Iranians look outside the state-run media for the truth, while their parents and grandparents may not. Telmah Parsa writes:

more soon as soon as i have the time.

piratz!

yes, they do exist, and this year has been a particularly bad one. mostly they operate off the somali coast in the gulf of aden, which borders the red and arabian seas, with yemen and somalia to the north and south, respectively. almost all cargo going to europe from asia must pass through the gulf, since it is the passageway to the red sea and the suez canal.

in this instance, they seem to have gotten their hands on some serious weaponry. might be beyond their capacity to use all the tanks, but there is an as yet undermined amount of light weaponry onboard, which can't be good for the situation in somalia, as it's already in crisis.

populism, venezuelan/dc style

so apparently dc law has it that you have to clear the sidewalk in front of your property. of course, the dc government hasn't managed to do that quite yet for a lot of city properties or areas with ill-defined property rights, a week after our "big" snowstorm. but that's not what we're talking about here.

occasioned by my running loop, i head down massachusetts avenue down embassy row. the only delegation on my route that has yet to clear the snow from the sidewalk in front of it's embassy is venezuela. you'd think a country that gives out free/discounted heating oil as a sign of it's goodwill towards the poor could manage to shovel off the sidewalk. after all, the people walking skew poor. power to the people indeed.

democracy and a dash of common sense

so, i was reading about the power sharing government that's been formed between Hamas and Fatah. given the terms, and the lack of concessions that Hamas has made towards Israel (namely, recognizing it), denouncing violence, etc., i'm not so sure how effective it will be at quelling violence in and around Palestine. looks like we'll have to wait a little longer for some meaningful developments in the middle east.

one thing stuck out in the article:

The agreement calls for Hamas to control nine government ministries, the most of any party, followed by Fatah with six.

this got me to thinking. wouldn't it seem that some of the failures of democracy in other countries is that they still operate in ways akin to some sort of spoils system? the spoils system was how the American system operated in the 1800s, where whichever party was in power distributed civil service jobs to friends, contributors, etc. now of course we have a non-partisan civil service, except for the higher level positions which are political appointees in executive branch agencies.

the situation where certain factions, either de jure or de facto, control certain ministries/agenices, certainly seems to contribute to die hard political activism, violence, etc., because people really do stand to lose access in some cases if their party loses. and while with non-partisan ministries/agencies means that it's very difficult to get around bureaucratic obstructions, treatment by these agencies is egalitarian and we have limited corruption. having partisan ministries leads to all sorts of trouble: bribery, graft, selective policy application, use of power against political rivals, etc., with all the concomitant problems. iraq, for example, has situations where certain parties (i'm unclear whether this is de jure or de facto) control certain ministries, where these problems have become endemic.

the point can be made, and it has been made in similar situations, about how the current administrations fixation on "democracy" as a fixative for the problems in other countries is completely misguided. this issue of partisan government agencies only serves to highlight the inadequacies of this perspective.

whither iran...and iraq

so, despite the fact that we haven't even come close to figuring out the first mess that we started, as josh marshall points out, the true question right now in american foreign policy is unfortunately whether or not we will attack iran. the administration can't even be bothered to stay focused on staying the course. hawks are out insinuating that iran was behind the recent attack on US forces in Karbala (although they are now apparently saying that it was actually a bunch of iraqi generals).

meanwhile, i'd say things were going from bad to worse in iraq, but i think we've past the point where such a statement is actually meaningful. it turns out that we're fighting an ever fractious group of enemies, and that, sadly unsurprisingly, the mahdi army has been using the iraqi defense forces as a way to equip and train their members. i think most people thought this was a problem, but not on this scale.

with the new national intelligence estimate on iraq released today, we find the intelligence community extremely pessimistic about the possibility of success for the president's surge plan, and for the future of iraq generally. basically, it finds that even if the surge plan could pacify baghdad to a significant degree, such that political dialogue could even be possible, it wouldn't make a difference. the political and sectarian gridlock is just too insurmountable. the sunnis can't adjust to their new role, the shiites can't make any concessions or accept any affronts to their majority status, and the kurds and their play for kirkuk could have drastic consequences (and lets not even mention the situation with turkey).

not only that, but the NIE explicitly rejects the possibility that iran can have any significant influence, given that iraq is already rending at the seams. i guess that might be the only positive thing about it. but then again, that probably won't even matter to the contingent pushing for confrontation.


Update: James Fallows has a gret piece about how while the choices in iraq are hard and necessitate losses and sacrifices, the choice concerning iran is straightforward and unambiguous: No war with Iran.